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NON-DEPLOYABLES: AN INCREASING CHALLENGE FOR THE ARMY
As we consider the road that unfolds before us, we remember with humble gratitude those brave Americans who, at this very hour, patrol far-off deserts and distant mountains. They have something to tell us, just as the fallen heroes who lie in Arlington whisper through the ages. We honor them not only because they are guardians of our liberty, but because they embody the spirit of service; a willingness to find meaning in something greater than themselves. While current personnel systems served the Army and its Soldiers well in recent years, the potential strain of decades of persistent conflict will likely fail to meet future needs.
The dual challenges of new force structure and continual deployments to multidimensional battlefields, strongly suggests the need to modify the Army's personnel systems so they effectively embrace creativity, risk-taking, and flexibility. 2 Prior to 9/11, commanders viewed deployability and unit readiness in a different way than they do today. Peacetime commanders often felt pressure to report their unit as "combat ready" which gave a new meaning to the personnel readiness ratings given today. 3 Every month the personnel officer, a battalion or brigade S1 or division G1, provided the complete personnel portion of the unit status report (USR) in accordance with Army Regulation 220-1 through command channels to Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) and the Army's senior leadership. The personnel data would be The definitions are the same, but the true meaning of being deployable versus being non-deployable during peace time took on a different light.
formulated, analyzed, and if required, manipulated to provide the Army leadership statistical analysis painting the picture that a unit was "combat ready".
After September 11, 2001 as units prepared for contingency operations in support of the global war on terror (GWOT), the Army's senior leaders identified a negative trend in the personnel readiness of the force. This trend portrayed that there were increasing numbers of non-deployable and non-available personnel reducing units' personnel readiness below acceptable levels for deployment. The percentage of Soldiers who were unavailable for combat has risen sharply in the past three years from 11% of each brigade in 2007 to 16% this year. 4 According to the 2009 Army Posture Statement, the Army had over 710,000
Soldiers on active duty from all components (Active duty, Reserve and National Guard)
fulfilling its global commitments. 18 The Army also had 255,000 or 36% of the force deployed in nearly 80 countries around the world, with 140,000 (20%) in active combat theaters. 19 Senior Army leaders are emphasizing that the Army is out of balance and is straining its ability to sustain the All-Volunteer Force and maintain strategic depth. MOSs. 26 The DEIP should assist BCT commanders in building cohesive and ready units by eliminating last-minute personnel changes. Also, since it will allow Army HR managers to identify Soldiers preparing to depart at their expiration term of service (ETS) date who will not deploy with the unit, then HQDA should be able to provide replacements for these Soldiers prior to the unit's deployment date. This should ensure there is ample time for new arrivals to effectively integrate into the unit and train on individual and collective tasks. 27 In September 2002, the consolidated PPG was originally approved for release. Based on the Soldier's MOS however, the new assignment is not guaranteed to be with a non-deploying unit.
Without detailed management by the HR specialist, the Soldier's cause for being nondeployable could place the Soldier in the same situation in which they started. 31 Based on these figures, the Army's senior leaders and the Secretary of Defense had a growing concern the Army would not be able to continue deploying forces at this pace and maintain its current end strength. In 2007
Secretary of Defense Gates won approval from Congress to increase the Army's active duty end strength to 547,000 Soldiers. The Army's intent of this "grow the Army" plan was to add six new BCTs to share the burden of repeated deployments. 32 In April 2007, Secretary Gates ordered the Army to stop building three new
BCTs and use the manpower originally allocated for these three, more than 10,000
Soldiers, to fill holes in existing units.
In theory, this would relieve the burden on deployed units but would not necessarily relieve the individual Soldier. 33 The 10,000 Soldiers would be used to raise the unit readiness for units preparing for deployment and replace Soldiers identified as nondeployable. To continue to relieve the pressure on the Army's personnel readiness, in
July 2009, Secretary Gates received a temporary increase of an additional 22,000
Soldiers designated for those units already scheduled to deploy. 34 This is a temporary increase from the current authorized permanent end strength of 547,000 to an authorized temporary end strength of 569,000 active duty Soldiers. 35 Army Colonel
Robin Mealer, a planner at the Pentagon told reporters "we try to get our units out the door at a minimum of 90 percent [of authorized strength] to deploy into combat." This is a very minimum goal and the Army is stressed to achieve it. 36 If the Army is going to be able to sustain multiple deployments for its Soldiers and units in the future, it must establish more restrictive assignment criteria for nondeployable Soldiers. This means Soldiers with a temporary non-deployable status should remain with their unit until they are deployable as outlined in the current PPG.
Reassigning non-deployable Soldiers to another deploying unit is not in the best interest of the next unit and its training readiness. Likewise, it is not cost effective to conduct a permanent change of station and move Soldiers characterized as temporarily nondeployable to another geographic location. Therefore, the Army should establish an adjusted time limit in the PPG giving a deploying commander a timeline to work with to ensure they will have the required personnel strength for the mission. A potential risk associated with reassigning temporary non-deployable Soldiers from combat units would be the loss of valuable combat experience from such units.
For example, in some cases a combat veteran with a temporary non-deployable condition which is not resolved prior to the newly established timeline may be reassigned. Another risk associated with this option would be creating the perception of allowing Soldiers the ability to stay on active duty and never deploy or not deploying again.
A challenge for the Army is that at any given point in time, approximately onethird of the Army has "never deployed" because most of the Soldiers in this category are new to the Army and are still in training. There is also 5.6% of active duty Soldiers who are deployable, but are assigned to positions in non-deploying commands and organizations that preclude them from deploying. 42 A permanently non-deployable Soldier would fall into this category. The positive side of this option is the Army would be taking care of Soldiers by providing them an opportunity to stay on active duty.
Because the Soldier would have already completed basic training, the cost to re-train them in another specialty would be minimal. The Army still has the requirement to fill all authorized positions in its units, and some of these positions may not require a Soldier to meet the deployment criteria outlined in the PPG or AR 614-30. Such Soldiers could still serve the Army as an instructor at a TRADOC school or running the supply system on an installation in the institutional part of the force. Therefore, to qualify to stay on active duty the criteria must be stringent but not so restrictive that no one qualifies.
A second option to ensure units deploy at 102% and commanders are not burdened with non-deployable Soldiers, would be to apply such restrictive personnel assignment policies which would require Soldiers to separate from the Army when they do not meet the deployment criteria due to a permanent non-deployable status, such as However, the risk associated with separating Soldiers with temporary nondeployable conditions as soon as they become non-deployable could be the political fallout from creating a perception that the Army is not taking care of Soldiers. In actuality, the Army's readiness must be its priority and HR managers must meet the Army's and commanders requirements. For example, a Soldier who does not meet the standard of completing a family care plan when they need one to deploy, would violate a direct order. Based on the Army's requirements to prepare a unit to deploy, deploying commanders often do not have the resources to deal with such issues. Separating
Soldiers from the Army in the most expedient manner possible, saves the Army time and money, and should in the long run ensure the deploying unit meets personnel readiness standards required for deployment. For example, separating Soldiers who do not meet standards could serve as a deterrent for other Soldiers who claim they are unable to deploy due to a lack of a family care plan and would ultimately improve the Army's overall unit readiness.
A third option for increasing the Army's force has been discussed and researched by many of the Army's senior leaders. A temporary troop increase to 569,000 can provide BCT commanders the troop strength required to deploy. 43 This temporary increase of forces was judged that the increase would sustain the projected level of deployments and lower the stress on the force. However, as mentioned
Secretary Gates directed the Army continue to reduce the size of the non-deployable or institutional side of the force which may also reduce the pressure on the operational force. 44 Senator Joe Lieberman expressed his concern to a Senate Subcommittee, when he stated:
I am concerned that if the Army is not big enough, the institutional Army will continue to be cut in order to increase the number of brigades. As many respected former Army leaders have pointed out, it is the institutional Army that is the keeper of Army values and skills and that passes those values and skills on to the new recruits. We have had too many examples of ethical failures when our institutional Army was too small or staffed with too many of less capable Soldiers. The sexual scandal at Aberdeen and the breakdown at Walter Reed come to mind. 45 Temporarily increasing the number of Soldiers in the Army creates a false picture that the Army can fulfill all of its assigned missions. The reality is that the increase is primarily a temporary fix because it provides deploying units short term immediate personnel relief enabling them to deploy as close to 102% as possible. However, over time the Army may still be unable to fulfill all of its requirements due to personnel shortages in the Army's critical MOSs which are usually the low density high demand specialties. This is because the increase offsets the Soldiers in the Trainee, Transient, Holdee and Student (TTHS) account which is where the Army has approximately 20% or 113,000 Soldiers. The TTHS account represents Soldiers not assigned to units. 46 Another challenge with the TTHS account is that not all training for each MOS is the same. Most Soldier trainees go through basic training and advance individual training attend for 9 to 13 weeks. For example, advanced individual training for military
Most of the Soldiers in the TTHS will eventually be assigned to a unit that will deploy.
However, the challenge is that each Soldier in the TTHS counts against the Army's end strength and significant shortages still exist in the low density high demand MOSs. By increasing the Army's end strength the Army has the ability to provide its Soldiers an increase in the amount of time they are at home station between deployments and to recover from repeated combat deployments. 48 The time between deployments is referred to as dwell time and the Army's goal is to provide its active duty
Soldiers with a dwell time of one year deployed and two years at home station. An
Army study confirmed that it takes Soldiers and units two to three years of dwell time to completely recover from a one year combat deployment. 49 Another risk of temporarily increasing the Army's end strength is it may create false expectations by senior leaders that deploying BCTs will continue to be filled to 102% and continue to be able to enjoy only a one to two year dwell time. When the Army no longer has an additional 22,000 Soldiers after 2013, it is likely deployment requirements may still remain. Therefore, unless the number of units required to deploy lessens, there can be no relief since the number of non-deployable Soldiers will continue to increase and other initiatives such as the adjusted dwell time will revert back to pre troop increase levels. However, the TTHS account will still likely remain at least 63,000 Soldiers up to its current level of 113,000 Soldiers. The only way to assist in reducing the personnel pressure created by the TTHS account would be to not count the Soldiers assigned to the TTHS in the Army's end strength. The challenge with this recommendation is that the Army must account for all Soldiers to DOD and Congress which provides funding for military personnel. Essentially the Army would have to request a permanent end strength increase to continue to support a large TTHS account.
As a result, it appears that to maintain current manning levels within the deploying BCTs, the Army must continue to receive an increased end strength of 22,000 additional Soldiers bringing its total to 569,000.
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To assist HR managers temporary non-deployable Soldiers should be placed on a late arrival date (LAD) plus 120 day timeline to be eligible for deployment with their unit of assignment. If they cannot meet this standard they should be reassigned to a unit on the installation so the unit can request a replacement that can deploy.
It is apparent the numbers of non-deployable Soldiers and the number of Soldiers in the TTHS account exceed the Army's ability to fill deploying BCTs and maintain dwell time at one year deployed and two years at home. However, the increase will continue to primarily assist deploying units and would not assist the Army in meeting its overall deployable end strength. The TTHS account does not provide the Army relief in end strength, but only provides a mechanism to account for Soldiers who are temporarily non-deployable due to one of the four categories it captures.
Permanently non-deployable Soldiers should be reassigned to one of two MACOMs, TRADOC or MEDCOM which will cause an open position within the deploying unit which AHRC must fill. A permanently non-deployable Soldier will never deploy so to remove them from a unit's' ranks will ensure the deployable strength of the unit is as close to 102% as possible because it opens up a position which AHRC must fill. It is also important to ensuring the criteria to retain permanently non-deployable Soldiers are stringent enough to enable them to contribute on active duty in a nondeploying unit but not so stringent that they must be separated from the Army through the chapter separation process. A temporary non-deployable Soldier's experience in most cases will not be totally lost based on the timeline established for local reassignment. A unit commander could benefit from these Soldiers' experience up to the point of deployment when these Soldiers are left behind until they meet the deployment criteria or are reassigned.
A challenge for the Army's senior leaders is that assigning non-deployable 
